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2026 INSC 692 • Supreme Court of India

Sagar v. State of Haryana

“No Reasoned Order, No Adult Trial: Supreme Court Acquits a Juvenile Convicted of Murder Because the Children's Court Never Passed the Mandatory Order Under Section 19(1) of the JJ Act”

13 July 2026Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice Prasanna B. Varale
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TL;DR

The Supreme Court held that passing a reasoned order under Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is mandatory for a Children's Court after it receives a case transferred by the Juvenile Justice Board under Section 18(3). The Children's Court must decide whether the child in conflict with law is to be tried as an adult or not, and cannot proceed with the trial without that decision. In this case a juvenile aged about 16 and a half years was found fit to be tried as an adult by the Board after a preliminary assessment (Section 15), but the Children's Court at Kaithal convicted him of murder under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment without passing any Section 19(1) order. Following Thirumoorthy v. State, the Court held that the entire trial was vitiated, set aside the conviction and sentence (and the High Court's affirmation), declined to remit the matter because of the passage of time (the appellant was then 24 and had spent more than six years in custody), and acquitted him.

The Bottom Line

A child accused of a heinous offence cannot be tried as an adult just because the Juvenile Justice Board said so. The Children's Court must itself apply its mind and pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1). The Supreme Court ruled that skipping that step is not a technicality but goes to the root of the trial, because it decides whether the case is run as a Sessions trial or as a child-centred inquiry with a maximum of three years in a special home. The conviction was quashed and the appellant acquitted, and Children's Courts across the country were directed to pass a reasoned Section 19(1) order before proceeding.

Case Timeline

The journey from FIR to Supreme Court verdict

event
21 Oct 2018

Alleged Incident and Death of Mandeep Kumar

The deceased was allegedly attacked near the Baba-Rajpuri fair by a group of masked persons and later died at Cygnus Hospital. An FIR was registered under Sections 148, 323, 341, 302 read with 149 IPC.

arrest
23 Oct 2018

Co-accused Arrested

Four co-accused were arrested, and their disclosure statements the following day were relied upon by the prosecution for alleged conspiracy and recoveries.

order
24 Jan 2019

Juvenile Justice Board Orders Trial as Adult

After a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the JJ Act, the Board opined that the appellant was liable to be tried as an adult and committed the case to the Children's Court under Section 18(3).

judgment
14 Mar 2019

Children's Court Convicts and Sentences Appellant

The Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal, sitting as the Children's Court, convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment, with detention in a place of safety until the age of 21. No Section 19(1) order was passed.

judgment
16 Dec 2023

High Court Dismisses Appeal

The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed Criminal Appeal CRA-D-649-2019 (O&M) after re-appreciating the evidence.

hearing
22 Apr 2025

Supreme Court Calls for Report on Section 19(1) Order

The Supreme Court noted that the appellant was a juvenile on the date of the offence and directed the District and Sessions Judge, Kaithal to report whether the Children's Court had passed an order under Section 19(1).

judgment
13 Jul 2026

Supreme Court Delivers Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence for non-compliance with Section 19(1) of the JJ Act, and acquitted the appellant.

The Story

On 21.10.2018, the police were informed that Mandeep Kumar had died at Cygnus Hospital after sustaining injuries in a quarrel. The prosecution alleged that the complainant (also named Mandeep Kumar, PW11), his friend Aman (PW12) and the deceased were returning on a motorcycle from the Baba-Rajpuri fair around 1:30 p.m. when seven masked persons on two motorcycles intercepted them. The appellant, identified as accused "S", allegedly struck the deceased on the left temporal region with an iron pipe, and the others attacked with knives and a rod. The deceased was taken to hospitals at Kaithal, then PGI Chandigarh, and then Cygnus Hospital, where he died.

The police registered an FIR under Sections 148, 323, 341, 302 read with 149 IPC. Four co-accused were arrested on 23.10.2018 and, according to the prosecution, their disclosure statements stated that they and the appellant had conspired to assault the deceased to teach him a lesson for hurling abuses on the appellant's mother and sister. Recoveries were made of an iron pipe, a danda, motorcycles and a knife, and call detail records placed the appellant and another accused near the village around the relevant time. A charge-sheet was filed against the appellant under Sections 302, 323 and 341 read with 148 and 149 IPC.

The appellant was a minor at the time of the offence (16 and a half years; a school record shows his date of birth as 20.04.2002). He was produced before the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Kaithal, which carried out a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the JJ Act and, by order dated 24.01.2019 in Criminal Case No. 04 of 2019, opined that he had the mental and physical capability and was liable to be tried as an adult, committing the matter under Section 18(3) to the Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal, as Children's Court. The Children's Court tried him and, by judgment dated 13/14.03.2019 in CIS No. SC/11/2019, convicted him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment, directing that he be kept in a place of safety until the age of 21 and thereafter be transferred to jail. The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed his Criminal Appeal (CRA-D-649-2019 (O&M)) on 16.12.2023.

During the hearing in the Supreme Court, counsel raised the plea that the Children's Court had passed no order under Section 19(1). By order dated 22.04.2025 the Court recorded that the school record showed the appellant was a juvenile on the date of the offence, and directed the District and Sessions Judge, Kaithal to report whether any such order existed. The report dated 19.05.2025 enclosed only the JJ Board's order of 24.01.2019 and said the trial records were not accessible. After examining the original trial record, the Court framed a single question: whether the conviction and sentence, affirmed by the High Court, could be sustained in the absence of an order under Section 19(1) of the JJ Act.

Legal Issues

Click each question to reveal the Supreme Court's answer

1Question

Whether the conviction and sentence imposed by the Children's Court on the appellant, and affirmed by the High Court, can be sustained in the absence of an order under Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015?

Tap to reveal answer
1SC Answer

No. The Court held that passing an order under Section 19(1) is mandatory, and that without it the Children's Court cannot proceed further with the matter. Although the Board had complied with Section 15, the non-compliance with Section 19(1), which determines whether the case is tried as a Sessions trial or a summons case, vitiated the entire trial. The conviction and sentence were set aside.

Confirms that the Children's Court cannot treat the Board's preliminary assessment as a substitute for its own reasoned decision under Section 19(1), and that skipping this step vitiates the trial and is not a curable irregularity.

2Question

Is the word "may" in Section 19(1) of the JJ Act directory or mandatory, and what is the consequence of non-compliance?

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2SC Answer

The Court held that "may" in Section 19(1) must be read as "shall". Reasons included the divergent consequences of an adult trial versus a child inquiry, the requirement in Rule 13(6) of the Model Rules, 2016 to record reasons, the distinct procedures (Sessions trial versus summons case), and the difference in the punishment that may be imposed. Following Thirumoorthy v. State, non-compliance vitiates the trial.

Resolves the nature of the Section 19(1) duty, which had been described earlier in Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh as one that is "not an empty formality".

3Question

Should the matter be remitted to the Children's Court to comply with Section 19(1), or should the appellant be acquitted?

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3SC Answer

The Court declined to remit. It noted that the appellant was by then 24 years old, a meaningful assessment of his mental capacity at the time of the offence in 2018 was no longer feasible, the trial was concluded, and he had been incarcerated for more than six years. No useful purpose would be served by remand, and he was acquitted.

Shows that the Court will not always remit for compliance with procedural mandates under the JJ Act where time has overtaken the possibility of a meaningful assessment, following the approach in Thirumoorthy.

Arguments

The battle of arguments before the Supreme Court

Petitioner

Vihaan Kumar

1

Appellant: Children's Court passed no order under Section 19(1)

At the hearing, counsel for the appellant raised the plea that, on committal of the case by the Juvenile Justice Board, the Children's Court had not passed any order as prescribed under Section 19(1) of the JJ Act. There was an assessment report from the Board regarding the appellant being tried as an adult, but no order on record showing application of mind by the Children's Court that, though a juvenile, he was liable to be tried as an adult.

Section 19(1) JJ Act, 2015
2

Appellant was a juvenile at the time of the offence

The original school record, produced pursuant to the Court's order of 04.11.2024, showed the appellant's date of birth as 20.04.2002, so that on 21.10.2018 he was a juvenile. The Court's order of 22.04.2025 recorded that there was no issue on this aspect.

Respondent

State of Haryana

1

State: conviction affirmed on the evidence by the High Court

The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC had been recorded after trial and was affirmed by the High Court after re-appreciation of the evidence. The Court records that the Board had, after a Section 15 assessment, opined that the appellant was to be tried as an adult and committed the matter to the Children's Court under Section 18(3). The judgment does not set out detailed oral submissions of the State on the Section 19(1) point.

Court's Analysis

How the Court reasoned its decision

The Court set out the sequence under the JJ Act for a child aged 16 to 18 accused of a heinous offence: apprehension and production before the Board (Section 10), a preliminary assessment of mental and physical capacity and ability to understand consequences (Section 15), transfer to the Children's Court under Section 18(3) if the Board finds a need for adult trial, and then Section 19(1), under which the Children's Court decides whether to try the child as an adult or to conduct an inquiry as a Board. The Court held that "may" in Section 19(1) must be read as "shall" for several reasons. First, the Children's Court cannot go further without deciding which course applies, and its jurisdiction to conduct either a Sessions trial or a Board-type inquiry depends on that decision. Second, Rule 13 of the Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2016, in particular sub-rule (6), requires the Children's Court to record reasons whether the child is to be treated as an adult or as a child. Third, the consequences differ greatly: a child tried by the Board faces orders under Section 18, including a special home for a period not exceeding three years, while an adult trial exposes the child to a longer sentence, subject to the limits in Sections 19 and 21. The Court cited Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu on the consequences of the preliminary assessment. Following Thirumoorthy v. State, where non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act vitiated the trial, the Court noted the factual difference (there, both Sections 15 and 19 were violated; here, only Section 19(1)), but held that without a Section 19(1) order the entire trial stands vitiated and followed the course adopted in Thirumoorthy. As remand was not feasible, it set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant.

passing of an order under Section 19(1) of the Act is mandatory in nature and without passing an order under Section 19(1), the Children's Court cannot proceed with the matter further.

Para 10.2

The central holding on the mandatory nature of the Section 19(1) order.

Section 19(1) is not merely procedural in nature, but constitutes a substantive provision, obligating the Children's Court to pass a reasoned order upon due application of mind.

Para 10.4.1

Characterises the duty as substantive and requiring recorded reasons, relying on Rule 13(1) and 13(6) of the Model Rules.

Even a remote possibility that a child in conflict with law, who ought to be tried as a child, is subjected to an adult trial, such adult trial is wholly impermissible and it strikes at the very root of the protective framework envisaged under the Act.

Para 10.5

Explains why non-compliance cannot be excused even if the final punishment might have been the same.

In the absence of compliance with Section 19(1), which is determinative of the procedure to be followed by the Court, whether a Sessions trial or a summons case, the entire trial stands vitiated.

Para 12

States the consequence of non-compliance and the reason for following Thirumoorthy.

the first duty of the Children's Court, after taking cognizance of the matter, is to pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) of the Act upon due assessment of the 'child in conflict with law' before it proceeds further in the matter.

Para 15

A direction of general application to Children's Courts across the country.

Allowed

The Verdict

Relief Granted

The appellant, who was 24 years old and had been in custody for more than six years, was acquitted on the sole ground that the trial was vitiated by non-compliance with Section 19(1). The Court did not decide the merits of the prosecution case.

Directions Issued

  • The conviction and sentence recorded by the Children's Court, and the High Court judgment affirming it, were set aside for non-compliance with Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
  • The matter was not remitted to the Children's Court, as a meaningful assessment of the appellant's mental capacity at the time of the offence was no longer feasible and he had undergone incarceration for over six years
  • The appellant was acquitted; being on bail, his bail bonds stood discharged
  • Children's Courts across the country were directed that, on receipt of records transferred by the Juvenile Justice Board under Section 18(3), their first duty after taking cognizance is to pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) upon due assessment of the child before proceeding further
  • Pending applications, if any, were disposed of

Key Legal Principles Established

1

Under Section 19(1) of the JJ Act, 2015, a Children's Court that receives a case from the Juvenile Justice Board under Section 18(3) must pass a reasoned order deciding whether the child is to be tried as an adult or as a child; the provision is mandatory and "may" is to be read as "shall".

2

The Children's Court cannot proceed with the trial without such an order, and the decision determines whether it follows the procedure of a Sessions trial or a summons case as a Board.

3

Rule 13(6) of the Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2016 requires the Children's Court to record its reasons for treating the child as an adult or as a child.

4

Non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act vitiates the entire trial, even where the Board has complied with Section 15.

5

The consequences of adult trial versus a child inquiry differ materially (including sentence and the maximum of three years in a special home under Section 18), so a mere possibility of an adult trial where none is warranted is impermissible.

6

Where years have passed and a meaningful assessment of the child's capacity at the time of the offence is no longer possible, a remand for compliance with Section 19(1) may serve no useful purpose, and the Court may set aside the conviction outright.

Key Takeaways

What different people should know from this case

  • Children aged 16 to 18 accused of heinous offences get special procedural safeguards under the Juvenile Justice Act, and these are not optional formalities.
  • A Juvenile Justice Board deciding that a child can be tried as an adult is not the end of the matter; the Children's Court must also decide that for itself and give reasons.
  • If this step is skipped, the whole trial can be declared invalid, even after a conviction and an appeal.
  • The outcome here turned on procedure and did not decide whether the accused committed the offence. The Court did not examine the evidence on the merits.
  • Families of victims should know that such procedural defects can undo a long trial, which is why courts are directed to get the process right at the start.
  • Age records, such as school certificates, matter: the appellant's juvenility was shown from his original school record.

Frequently Asked Questions

The Court held that a Children's Court must pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 before trying a child as an adult, and that this requirement is mandatory. As no such order was passed, the trial was vitiated. The Court set aside the appellant's murder conviction and 14-year sentence and acquitted him.
Under Section 15, the Juvenile Justice Board makes a preliminary assessment of a 16 to 18 year old accused of a heinous offence and, if it finds a need for adult trial, transfers the case under Section 18(3). Under Section 19(1), the Children's Court then decides for itself whether the child is to be tried as an adult or to be dealt with through an inquiry as a Board. In Sagar, Section 15 was complied with but Section 19(1) was not.
The Court noted that the appellant was 24 years old, the trial was already over, and he had been in custody for more than six years. It held that it would no longer be feasible to make a meaningful assessment of his mental capacity at the time of the offence in 2018, so remand would serve no useful purpose.
No. The Court did not decide the merits of the prosecution case. It set aside the conviction solely because the trial was vitiated by the failure to comply with Section 19(1) of the JJ Act, and acquitted the appellant on that basis.
Yes. The Court held that "may" in Section 19(1) must be read as "shall", relying on the scheme of the Act, Rule 13 of the Model Rules, 2016, the different procedures and punishments in an adult trial versus a child inquiry, and earlier decisions such as Ajeet Gurjar and Thirumoorthy.
The Court directed Children's Courts across the country that, upon receipt of records transferred by the Juvenile Justice Board under Section 18(3), their first duty after taking cognizance is to pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1), after due assessment of the child, before proceeding further.

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