Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka
“Section 498A Extends to Live-In Relationships in the Nature of Marriage, but Only Where There Is Intent to Marry”
TL;DR
A Division Bench of the Supreme Court held that a man in a live-in relationship can be prosecuted for cruelty under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, if the relationship is one "in the nature of marriage" with the intent to marry being an intrinsic part of it, and the relationship is between consenting adults. The Court gave the word "husband" a purposive interpretation and found that excluding such relationships would offend Article 14, that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (a civil remedy) is not an adequate substitute, and that the choice of relationship is part of individual autonomy. To prevent misuse, it placed the initial burden of proving the intent to marry on the woman, confined the ruling to Section 498A alone, and directed strict application of the Arnesh Kumar arrest safeguards. The appellant's petition to quash the proceedings was not allowed, because the allegations, taken at face value, disclosed an offence; the Trial Court may proceed in accordance with law.
The Bottom Line
Section 498A, which punishes cruelty by a husband or his relatives, can now apply to a man in a live-in relationship that is truly like a marriage, meaning the couple intended to marry. This is not a blanket rule for all live-in couples, the woman must show that intent, and arrests cannot be made without preliminary inquiry. The Court did not decide whether the allegations in this case are true; it only refused to quash the proceedings at this stage.
Case Timeline
The journey from FIR to Supreme Court verdict
Alleged Marriage
The appellant and respondent no. 2 were alleged to have married as per Hindu customs and rituals and thereafter lived in Bengaluru. Whether they were validly married was disputed.
Alleged Marriage
The appellant and respondent no. 2 were alleged to have married as per Hindu customs and rituals and thereafter lived in Bengaluru. Whether they were validly married was disputed.
High Court Refuses to Quash
The Karnataka High Court rejected the appellant's petitions, holding that "husband" in Section 498A includes a man in a void or voidable marriage or a live-in relationship bearing the attributes of marriage.
High Court Refuses to Quash
The Karnataka High Court rejected the appellant's petitions, holding that "husband" in Section 498A includes a man in a void or voidable marriage or a live-in relationship bearing the attributes of marriage.
Supreme Court Delivers Judgment
The Supreme Court held that Section 498A applies to live-in relationships in the nature of marriage with intent to marry, declined to quash the proceedings, and applied the Arnesh Kumar safeguards.
Supreme Court Delivers Judgment
The Supreme Court held that Section 498A applies to live-in relationships in the nature of marriage with intent to marry, declined to quash the proceedings, and applied the Arnesh Kumar safeguards.
The Story
Dr. Lokesh B.H., the appellant, and respondent no. 2, Smt. Theertha, were alleged to have been married as per Hindu customs and rituals on 17 October 2010 and to have lived in Bengaluru. From 2016 their relationship deteriorated and respondent no. 2 filed two complaints, resulting in Crime No. 383 of 2016 and Crime No. 450 of 2016. The first led to a charge-sheet (CC No. 630 of 2019) under Section 498A IPC before the III Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and JMFC, Shivamogga. The second led to a charge-sheet (CC No. 28129 of 2023) under Sections 498A, 504, 506, 307, 494 and 149 of the IPC, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, before the XXIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.
The appellant's position was that the parties were not married at all, so Section 498A could not apply, while respondent no. 2 claimed a valid subsisting marriage. The allegations in the FIR were that the appellant had suppressed the fact of a prior marriage, and that he and his family members harassed respondent no. 2 for dowry and caused physical injury, including burns on her leg.
The appellant sought quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. By a common judgment dated 18 November 2025 in Criminal Petition Nos. 8134 of 2024 and 9412 of 2021, the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru rejected the petitions. It held that requiring a valid marriage for Section 498A was an unduly technical construction, that the appellant had suppressed his first marriage and then presented himself as her husband, and that the expression "husband" extends to a man in a void or voidable marriage and to a live-in relationship bearing the attributes of marriage, provided the ingredients of cruelty are satisfied.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant (represented by Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, senior counsel) urged strict construction of the penal provision, and the Union of India supported that view. The State of Karnataka and respondent no. 2 supported the High Court. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Additional Solicitor General, and Ms. Nina R. Nariman assisted the Court as amicus curiae, and Ms. Nariman argued for a purposive interpretation of Section 498A.
Legal Issues
Click each question to reveal the Supreme Court's answer
Arguments
The battle of arguments before the Supreme Court
Petitioner
Vihaan Kumar
Penal provisions must be strictly construed, so "husband" means a man in a valid marriage
Mr. Nuli argued that Section 498A, being a penal provision, must be construed strictly to include only a husband in a valid and lawful marriage, not a void one. He submitted that the woman is not left remedy-less because other provisions of the IPC and the DV Act apply, and relied on Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, U. Suvetha v. State and Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao.
Union of India: live-in relationships do not constitute marriage
The Union of India supported the appellant, contending that parliamentary debates on the DV Act recorded that prior remedies, including Section 498A, catered to married women, that living together does not constitute marriage under the statutory regime, and that any inadequacy in the law is for Parliament to remedy. It relied on D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma and other decisions for the position that not all live-in relationships are relationships in the nature of marriage.
Respondent
State of Haryana
Respondent no. 2 and the State: "husband" must be given a purposive construction
Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, for respondent no. 2, adopted the High Court's reasoning and submitted, relying on Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., that Section 498A is maintainable where a second wife who is not legally wedded has been induced into the marriage and subjected to cruelty. Otherwise a wrongdoer would take advantage of his own wrong. The State of Karnataka supported her position and prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
Amicus curiae: Section 498A must be read in light of Articles 14, 15(3) and 21
Ms. Nina R. Nariman, as amicus curiae, supported application of Section 498A to live-in relationships that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage", arguing for a purposive interpretation of legislation with socially reformative objectives, in accordance with Articles 14, 15(3) and 21. She drew on Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, where the restriction in Section 2(q) of the DV Act to adult male relatives was struck down.
Court's Analysis
How the Court reasoned its decision
The Court framed the question as whether Section 498A IPC can be construed to include a man in a live-in relationship, given that the section uses the word "husband". It discussed strict interpretation of penal statutes and the mischief rule and purposive interpretation, then traced the origin and misuse of Section 498A, which was introduced in 1983 to address cruelty to married women in the domestic setting beyond the narrow reach of the dowry laws. It considered the concept of a "relationship in the nature of marriage", which had been developed by the Court in the DV Act context in D. Velusamy and Indra Sarma, and concluded that the DV Act provides a largely civil remedy and is no substitute for criminal law protection. It then treated the matter as also a constitutional question: choosing to live in such a relationship is part of individual autonomy, and the law cannot protect a woman from cruelty in a marriage while leaving a similarly situated woman unprotected merely because of the lack of a formal ceremony, which does not satisfy Article 14. Applying Heydon's case, it found the intent behind Section 498A was to stop domestic cruelty in its various forms and advance the remedy. Recognising the growing misuse of Section 498A, it limited the extension to relationships with the intent to marry, placed the initial burden on the woman, confined the ruling to Section 498A, and applied Arnesh Kumar. On the facts, it declined to quash the proceedings.
to say that the DV Act provides for adequate protection to women in ‘relationships in the nature of marriage’ would be a misstatement of law.
Para 14
Dismisses the argument that civil remedies under the DV Act are an adequate substitute for criminal law protection.
It is held, therefore, that a woman in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” shall be protected under Section 498A, giving the word “husband” a purposive interpretation, keeping in view the reformative, corrective and socially beneficial intent of the Section.
Para 20
States the core holding extending Section 498A to such relationships.
Those relationships that are in the nature of marriage and also have the requisite intent to marry are the closest to marriage itself, and it is those relationships that shall be entitled to the protection of this Section.
Para 21
Adds the intent-to-marry requirement, distinguishing the penal context from the civil DV Act context.
the initial burden of proof would be on the female live-in-partner seeking protection of the law.
Para 21
Allocates the burden of showing the intent to marry to the woman invoking Section 498A.
Whether or not this actually happened is a matter of trial.
Para 22
Explains why the quashing petition was not allowed: factual disputes are for the Trial Court.
The Verdict
Relief Granted
The appellant did not obtain quashing of CC No. 28129 of 2023 and CC No. 630 of 2019, which may proceed before the Trial Court. The Court's ruling provides a framework for applying Section 498A to marriage-like live-in relationships, with the arrest safeguards.
Directions Issued
- Section 498A is applicable to "live-in relationships" that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage", with the intent to marry established as an intrinsic part
- The live-in relationships protected are those between two consenting adult individuals
- The proposition is limited to Section 498A IPC only, and the extended interpretation shall not affect any other provision
- The safeguards against arrest in Arnesh Kumar shall be strictly applied; no person in a relationship in the nature of marriage accused of cruelty against a woman, being the live-in partner or his relative, shall be arrested without preliminary enquiries
- This is not a fit case for the proceedings to be quashed; the Trial Court shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law
- The discussion on the facts is limited to the adjudication of the appeals against denial of quashing and is not a comment on the merits of the matter
Key Legal Principles Established
The word "husband" in Section 498A IPC is to be given a purposive interpretation in light of the reformative, corrective and socially beneficial intent of the provision.
Section 498A applies to live-in relationships that are "in the nature of marriage" and in which the intent to marry is an intrinsic part, between consenting adults.
Not all live-in relationships are relationships in the nature of marriage, and not all relationships in the nature of marriage "mimic marriage"; where the intent to marry is absent, there is no reason to equate the relationship with marriage for penal provisions.
The initial burden of proving the intent to marry lies on the female live-in partner seeking the protection of Section 498A.
The DV Act is a civil remedy and does not make criminal law protection against cruelty unnecessary for women in relationships in the nature of marriage.
Differentiating between a married woman and a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage for protection against cruelty does not satisfy Article 14; the right to choose one's partner is an intrinsic part of individual autonomy.
The extended interpretation is limited to Section 498A and does not affect any other provision.
The arrest safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar apply strictly in such cases, and no arrest should be made without preliminary enquiries.
Key Takeaways
What different people should know from this case
- A woman in a live-in relationship that is like a marriage, where the couple intended to marry, can seek protection against cruelty under Section 498A just as a married woman can.
- The protection is not available in every live-in arrangement; the woman has to show that the relationship was in the nature of marriage and that there was an intent to marry.
- The ruling covers only Section 498A and does not change other laws.
- Police cannot arrest the man or his relatives automatically; they must follow the Arnesh Kumar safeguards and carry out preliminary enquiries first.
- The Court did not decide whether the allegations against the appellant are true; that will be decided at the trial.
Legal Framework
Applicable laws and provisions
Constitutional Provisions
Article 14
Constitution of India
“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”
Relevance: The Court held that distinguishing between a married woman and a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage, for protection against cruelty, does not satisfy Article 14.
Articles 15(3) and 21
Constitution of India
“Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women and children; Article 21 protects life and personal liberty, including individual autonomy and privacy.”
Relevance: Relied on by the amicus and the Court to support a purposive interpretation of Section 498A and to recognise the choice of relationship as part of autonomy and privacy.
Statutory Provisions
Section 498A
Indian Penal Code, 1860
“Punishes a husband or relative of the husband of a woman who subjects her to cruelty, with the explanation defining cruelty to include wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or cause grave injury, and harassment to coerce her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands for property or valuable security.”
Relevance: The provision at the centre of the case; the question was whether "husband" includes a man in a live-in relationship in the nature of marriage.
Section 2(f)
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
“"Domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family.”
Relevance: Source of the concept "relationship in the nature of marriage", considered in D. Velusamy and Indra Sarma and adapted by the Court, with the added intent to marry, for the penal context.
Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
“Inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice.”
Relevance: The appeals arose from the refusal of the High Court to quash the proceedings under this power.
Sections 3 and 4
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
“Penalties for giving or taking dowry and for demanding dowry.”
Relevance: Invoked in CC No. 28129 of 2023 alongside Section 498A and other IPC provisions.
Related Cases & Precedents
D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal
followed(2010) 10 SCC 469
Discussed the concept of a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under the DV Act and noted live-in relationship as a new social phenomenon taken notice of by Parliament.
Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma
followed(2013) 15 SCC 755
Laid down non-exhaustive guidelines for a relationship in the nature of marriage under the DV Act; the Court noted that some relationships meeting them may still lack the intent to marry.
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar
followed(2014) 8 SCC 273
Laid down safeguards against routine arrest in Section 498A cases; the Court directed their strict application to live-in relationships covered by this judgment.
Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh
distinguished(2007) 15 SCC 369
Relied on by the appellant, where a conviction under Section 498A was set aside because the marriage in question was null and void.
U. Suvetha v. State
distinguished(2009) 6 SCC 757
Relied on by the appellant for the view that a person must have contracted a valid marriage to be included within the term "husband" under Section 498A.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
followed1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
Guidelines for quashing of criminal proceedings, applied in declining to quash the proceedings against the appellant.
Watch & Learn
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Kannada
Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka - Kannada Explanation
Tamil
Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka - Tamil Explanation
Telugu
Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka - Telugu Explanation
Hindi
Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka - Hindi Explanation
English
Dr. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka - English Explanation
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